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The Growth of Pentecostalism in Brazil  
 
 Pentecostalism is the largest and fastest growing religion not only in Brazil, but in the 
world.  Because its growth contradicts previous predictions of sociologists that as economies 
develop, religiosity will diminish,
1
 a large volume of research has been devoted to the subject.  
The result has generally been a consensus that Pentecostalism primarily attracts the Third World 
poor in populations who have been marginalized by globalization
2
 and geographies where 
overall human development is low.
3
  Yet Brazil has not only made progressive strides in 
education and poverty, it is one of the fastest growing economies in the world.     
 In Brazil, Pentecostalism has grown so rapidly that statistics gathered for the World 
Christian Encyclopedia in 2000 show followers made up nearly 47 percent of the population,
4
 
while the most recent census taken by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) 
in 2010 records approximately 42.3 million people (or 23 percent of the population) as 
Pentecostal.  Still, a 2006 report by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life reported 49 
percent of Brazil's population as Pentecostal, although they did acknowledge that samples taken 
in Brazil were not national, and had been disproportionately collected in urban areas.
5
   
 Traditional explanations for its growth maintain that Pentecostalism is a religious 
adaptation to urban culture,
6
 and has become a global religion for a globalized world because it 
addresses the personal alienation that accompanies urbanization.  Known as “deprivation theory” 
                                                 
 1.  Paul Freston. “A Quiet Tendency to Spread the Word,” Times Higher Education Supplement 
1749 (June 30, 2006): 20. 
2.  Paul Freston. “A Quiet Tendency,” 21. 
 3.  Brian Grim. “Pentecostalism's Growth in Religiously Restricted Environments,” Society 46, 
no. 6 (Nov 2009): 484.  
 4.  David B. Barrett, George T. Kurian and Todd M. Johnson. World Christian Encyclopedia: A 
Comparative Study of Churches and Religions in the Modern World, AD 1900-2000 (Nairobi: Oxford 
University Press, 1982). 
5.   Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life.  Spirit and Power: A 10-Country Survey of 
Pentecostals Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, October 2006.  
 6.  Freston. “Pentecostalism in Brazil: A Brief History,” Religion 25, no. 2 (1995): 131. 
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this explanation for the worldwide growth of Pentecostalism is “incomplete, at best.”7  It fails to 
explain the paradox of its simultaneously rapid growth in countries where human development 
and median incomes are high (such as the United States and the United Kingdom), or why the 
wealthy appear to be joining the Pentecostal movement at an ever increasing rate.  
 One possible explanation that has had little attention is the ever widening gap in income 
inequality which has resulted as a consequence of economic globalization.  It is possible that 
Pentecostalism may be of as much utility to the poor as a coping strategy as it is to the rich as a 
tool of social control. Because the organizational structure of Pentecostal denominations follows 
an authoritarian model and there is a relationship between income inequality and the willingness 
of populations to accept authoritarianism,
8
 there may be cause for concern.   
 Despite Brazilian law separating church and state and the tendency of Pentecostals to 
view themselves as removed from the formal political sphere,
9
 Pentecostal churches in Brazil 
have become more and more aggressively involved in politics in recent years.  They have 
installed their own people in public office, purchased powerful television and radio networks, 
and attempted to leverage their political power to “create representative organs capable of 
mediating the increasingly important relationship with the state”.10  One of the largest 
denominations, Bishop Edir Macedo's Universal Church of the Kingdom of God or the Igreja 
Universal do Reino de Deus (IURD) not only used his power with the votes of church members 
to guarantee election of three federal deputies in 1990 who would be sympathetic to his goal of 
                                                 
 7.  Frederick Solt, Philip Habel, and J. Tobin Grant. “Economic Inequality, Relative Power, and 
Religiosity,” Social Science Quarterly 92, no. 2 (June 2011): 448.  
 8.  Frederick Solt.“The Social Origins of Authoritarianism,” Political Research Quarterly (Dec, 
2012): 704. 
 9.  Hannah K.W. Stewart-Gambino. “Religious Consumers in a Changing Religious 
Marketplace,” Latin American Research Review 36, no. 1 (2001): 193-206.  
 10.  Paul Freston. “The Protestant Eruption into Modern razilian Politics,” Journal of 
contemporary Religion 11, no. 2 (1996): 193. 
  
3 
 
purchasing a large television network, but also installed six federal deputies in the government in 
1994.
11
     
 Are such maneuvers an acceptable by-product of a political tradition of clientelistic 
behavior, or could some of these organizations, with their coffers full of unknown millions, 
actually pose a threat to the democratization of Brazil?  The acceptance of authoritarianism 
combined with the encouragement of nationalism and the power to control elections and 
monopolize media that may be used for propaganda, are all historical tenets of fascism. What 
level of concern should there be when it comes to tolerating the political access that groups like 
Macedo's have attained?   
 Is there any significant relationship between income inequality and the growth of 
Pentecostalism? And if so, does research show that nationalism and authoritarianism are natural 
companions of income inequality?  Up until now, there has been a general agreement that 
because of the ‘fissaparity’ of the church – that is, the phenomena of individual believers 
perpetually starting new churches, and the tendency of those within larger denominations to 
break away and start new churches – there will never be enough institutional unity among 
Pentecostals to present any political threat.  Observers may have created a false sense of security 
for themselves in these assessments, however, and a reassessment of the growth and perpetuation 
of Pentecostalism may be in order. 
I.   Evangelical vs. Pentecostal 
 Because the terms Pentecostal and Evangelical are sometimes used interchangeably, a 
clarification of their distinction for purposes of this paper is in order.  Evangelical refers to the 
tradition within Protestant Christianity of emphasizing the authority of the Bible, personal 
                                                 
 11.  Freston. “Pentecostalism in Brazil,” 129. 
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conversion, and the doctrine of salvation by faith in the Atonement.
12
 It also places a strong 
emphasis on the importance of preaching as contrasted with ritual.
13,14
  Pentecostal refers to “any 
number of Christian sects and individuals emphasizing baptism in the Holy Spirit as evidenced 
by speaking in tongues, prophecy, healing, and exorcism [with reference to the baptism in the 
Holy Spirit at the first Pentecost (Acts 2: 9-11)].”15   
So while most Pentecostals are Evangelicals, many Evangelicals are not Pentecostals, a 
distinction which has sometimes been problematic for Pentecostals.  Because Pentecostal belief 
is centered around the events of the Pentecost
16
 described in Acts 2 that include the receipt of the 
Gifts of the Holy Spirit as evidenced by speaking in tongues (also known as glossolalia), then 
according to Pentecostal belief, an individual who has never spoken in tongues has not received 
the Holy Spirit.  Yet the famous evangelist, Reverend Billy Graham, who is a hero to most 
Pentecostals, has admitted never speaking in tongues.  Nevertheless, most Pentecostals believe 
that Reverend Graham is definitely filled with the Gifts of the Holy Spirit.  To maintain 
otherwise would not only negate the evangelical work he has done, including the conversion of 
millions of people who subsequently adopted the Pentecostal faith, but it would also mean that 
he is not eligible for Kingdom of God and eternal life.  This rigidity of Pentecostal belief 
regarding tongues is one of those cognitive dissonance moments that Pentecostals have had to 
grapple with. 
 
                                                 
 12.  Atonement being defined as the reconciliation of God and man through the death of Jesus 
Christ. 
 13.  The New Miriam-Webster Dictionary (1989), s.v. “Evangelical”. 
 14.  Oxford English Dictionary online, s.v. “Evangelical,” Accessed Nov 12, 2012,  
   http://oxforddictionaries.com. 
 15.  Oxford English Dictionary online, s.v. “Pentecostal,” Accessed Nov12, 2012 
   http://oxforddictionaries.com.  
 16.   A Christian celebration of the day the apostles received the Holy Spirit. 
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 Another reason it is important to understand the variance in terminology used to describe 
Pentecostals is in the examination of statistical research.   For example, in statistics from the 
2006 report by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life,
17
 Pentecostals have been separated 
from Charismatics (who also hold Pentecostal beliefs), and then reclassified together under the 
heading of “Renewalists”.  In contrast, statistics regarding the renewalist churches or renovados 
in Brazil refer only to those historical protestant churches who either converted to Pentecostalism 
or became off-shoots of the historical church, and added Renewalist to their official names as a 
way of indicating their Pentecostal belief.
18
  In addition, when the IBGE records its census data 
on religion, it breaks Evangelicals into subheadings of Evangélicas de missão and Evangélicas 
de origem pentecostal, and the Brazilian churches listed under Evangélicas de missão (such as 
Igreja evangélica metodista or Igreja evangélica adventiste
19
) are churches which have adapted 
to Pentecostalism, even though a companion church with the same name in another country may 
not be practicing this way.  Therefore, for purposes of this paper, “Pentecostal” will be the only 
term used to describe this group. 
II.  History of Pentecostalism in Brazil 
 The original Pentecostal movement began in Los Angeles, California in 1906 with a 
revival meeting led by African American preacher William Seymore, who believed in glossolalia 
as evidence of receipt of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit.  Known as the Azusa Street Revival, the 
meeting continued for several years and was the catalyst for church leaders who, after receiving 
the Holy Spirit in this manner, subsequently went out and established Pentecostal churches 
around the world.   
                                                 
 17.  Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life.  Spirit and Power, 4. 
 18.  For example, the Igreja Batista Renovada and the Igreja Presbiteriana Renovada (Renewed 
Baptist Church and Renewed Presbyterian Church). 
19.  See Appendix A. 
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 While there are numerous Pentecostal churches in Brazil today, Paul Freston divides their 
chronological emergence into three main waves:
20
 
1. Assemblies of God and the Christian Congregation of Brazil (1911); 
 
2. Church of the Foursquare Gospel (1953), Brazil for Christ (1955), and God is 
Love (1962); and 
 
3. Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (IURD) (1977).   
 
 Assemblies of God (AG), Foursquare, and IURD were the matrices for all other 
Pentecostal churches in Brazil:
21
 Brazil for Christ and God is Love were founded by former 
members of Assemblies of God, and the IURD was founded by a former member of New Life, 
which was also founded by a former member of AG.   Assemblies of God was the first 
Pentecostal church, and was established in 1911 by two Swedish Baptist missionaries (Gunnar 
Vingren and Daniel Berg), acting on a prophecy to go to the state of Pará in northern Brazil.  
After their message caused a schism in the Baptist church in Belém, they were expelled along 
with 11 others, and set up the “Apostle Faith Mission,” which later became the “Assemblies of 
God.”22 By 1930, the Assemblies of God church had spread throughout all the states of Brazil 
and continues to be the only Pentecostal church with a nationwide geographical presence today.
23
  
 Also motivated by prophecy, an Italian missionary who never even lived in Brazil, 
founded the Christian Congregation of Brazil (CCB).  Both the Swedish founders of the AG and 
the Italian founder of the CCB had emigrated to the United States, where they were exposed to 
Pentecostalism, while the Foursquare church was founded by an American missionary who 
traveled to Brazil.  The entire movement began outside Brazil and was brought there by 
                                                 
20.  Freston, “Pentecostalism in Brazil,” 119-133. 
21.  Cecília Loreto Mariz, Coping with Poverty: Pentecostals and Christian Base Communities in 
Brazil (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994): 25. 
22.  Freston, “Pentecostalism in Brazil,” 122. 
23.  Freston, “Pentecostalism in Brazil,” 121. 
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outsiders.  Brazil for Christ was the first church founded by a native Brazilian, as were God is 
Love and the IURD.  As missionary churches, the Pentecostal movement was originally funded 
by outsiders, and many churches continue to receive large amounts of money from churches in 
other countries today.  
III.  The Growth of Pentecostalism  
 Beginning with the emergence of Catholic base communities (CEBs), social scientists 
have taken an interest in studying religion in Brazil and its ability “to foster or hinder 
modernization.”24  Because religiosity was expected to decline with modernization, the growth of 
Pentecostalism has been intriguing, and questions surrounding why it has grown so rapidly 
continue to be the focus of research.  So far, however, there is still a general consensus that 
Pentecostalism attracts mostly poor and uneducated Brazilians who are frustrated with their 
socio-economic lot in modern industrial society.  Some also believe Pentecostalism is a backlash 
to CEBs and Liberation Theology, and that its power to draw Catholic practitioners away is 
because its focus on the supernatural that can be experienced on a daily basis
25
 more closely 
parallels the mysticism of traditional Afro-Brazilian religions.   
Freston maintains that the IURD represents an intersection of Brazilian religious tradition 
and modern urban culture,
26
 but Pentecostal practices actually run contrary to this idea.  While 
Pentecostalism may be a reaction to urban culture, its “intersection with Brazilian tradition” is 
debatable.  Pentecostals do not follow the syncretic practices of traditional Afro-Brazilian 
religions or “folk Catholicism,”27 but rather have a rigid and more singular focus on the correct 
                                                 
24.  Hannah K.W. Stewart-Gambino. “Religious Consumers in a Changing Religious 
Marketplace,” Latin   American   Research Review 36, no. 1 (2001): 193-206. 
25.  Mariz, Coping with Poverty, 67. 
26.  Freston, “Pentecostalism in Brazil,” 131. 
27.  Referring to non-romanized Catholicism.  Mariz, Coping with Poverty, 62. 
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way to practice Christianity.  They are also very critical of the historical emphasis placed on 
symbols and rituals by Catholic and Afro-Brazilians religions, and specifically exclude symbols 
from their churches while encouraging spontaneous (as opposed to formal) prayer.
28
  Any spirits 
other than the Holy Spirit are considered to be devils, and members are sometimes attracted to 
Pentecostalism as a protection from the magic of traditional religions.  In fact, the focus of 
Pentecostal belief can be so single-minded and exclusionary that some pastors have used it to 
engage in violent rhetoric that resulted in member attacks on people believed to be practicing 
Afro-Brazilian religions because they were dressed in white (umbanistas wear white), even 
though victims have occasionally turned out to be health care workers.
29
  Such “outbreaks of 
violence constitute dramatic departures from the Brazilian tradition of religious tolerance.”30 
 As a religion brought to Brazil by outsiders, some have accused the American CIA pof 
funding the Pentecostal movement as a response to the Marxist thinking embedded in the 
philosophy of the CEBs.
31
  It does not appear, however, that the growth of Pentecostalism is any 
kind of backlash to CEBs and Liberation Theology. This suggestion is based on the idea that the 
deemphasis of spiritual and mystical elements of faith by the CEBs drove the poor to seek them 
elsewhere.
32
  Even though CEBs were addressing the needs of the poor, the poor who were 
drawn to CEBs were those who were able to actively participate in them, and this group did not 
include the wide swath of population that was ultimately drawn to Pentecostalism.   
Cécilia Mariz is a Brazilian national and Professor of Sociology at the Universidade 
Federal de Pernambuco in Recife.  In her field studies of participants in CEBs, Pentecostalism, 
                                                 
28.  Mariz, Coping with Poverty, 65. 
29.  Joseph Page. The Brazilians (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1995): 381.  
 30.  Page, The Brazilians, 381. 
 31.  Page, The Brazilians, 376. 
 32.  Page, The Brazilians, 377. 
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and Afro-Brazilian religions, Mariz points out that the very nature of Pentecostalism serves those 
who were never well-served by CEBs and vice versa.  One of the primary differences between 
the emphasis of the CEB and the Pentecostal faith is the focus on community rather than the 
individual.  When Mariz interviewed CEB leaders, she found that they were aware the poorest of 
the poor could not participate, and that most of the leaders and participants were women who did 
not work outside the home or men who were not employed.
33
  The activities of CEBs are not 
conducive to those who are employed.  They require personal time, that might otherwise be spent 
with family, to be devoted to the community, and many poor people simply cannot afford to do 
this.  Mariz found that once an individual was employed, it was not uncommon for them to leave 
the CEB for this very reason – lack of time.  This is not to say that the Pentecostal faith does not 
require participation and time from their members, but the time demands made on Pentecostals 
by the church are more easily met by those who are working and have demanding personal 
responsibilities, like children at home. 
 The other reason CEBs lacked the attraction of Pentecostalism is because of the 
Pentecostal emphasis on divine healing.  One of the most common claims by converts to 
Pentecostalism is deliverance from addictions like alcoholism (as Mariz points out, a personal 
problem that would have kept a person from being able to participate in a CEB).  Since 
alcoholism is one of the most serious problems among the poor, and households headed by 
alcoholics tend to experience the worst poverty in Brazil,
34
 it is obvious why power to heal the 
individual would hold such a strong attraction for the poor.  Conversion to Pentecostalism has 
been credited with healing a range of afflictions from mental illness to alcoholism and drug 
addiction.  Therefore, the Movimento de Cura Divina (Movement for Divine Healing) has been 
                                                 
 33.  Mariz, Coping with Poverty, 46. 
34.  Mariz, Coping with Poverty, 148. 
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its dominant attraction for Brazilians. 
 
IV.  Movement for Divine Healing 
 While there are many types of Pentecostal churches in Brazil, including the renewal 
churches (renovados), which are off-shoots of historical churches, the fastest growing are those 
with an emphasis on divine healing, such as that of the IURD.  Most of these divine healing 
churches have less rigid moral restrictions than traditional Pentecostal churches, and are 
primarily focused on expelling the Afro-Brazilian spirits which are identified as evil spirits.
35
   
Whereas CEBs do not deal in the supernatural, and Afro-Brazilian religions generally accept all 
of the supernatural, for the Pentecostal, there is only one acceptable spirit, the Holy Spirit.   
Paul Freston, who is the author of several books on Protestantism and politics in Latin 
America, completed his doctoral thesis on Protestants and politics in Brazil at the University of 
Campinas, Brazil, and has published extensively in Portuguese and English on the sociology of 
Protestantism in Latin America.  In his analysis of the growth of the Foursquare church in Brazil, 
he reduces the appeal of the church to an operation of the consumer market.  Freston says that 
the Pentecostal church has “displaced sin and hell with the felt needs of physical and 
psychological healing,” as an adaptation to a consumer society and the religious market.36  But 
his intimation that people are choosing what's less morally challenging because it’s easier and 
more physically gratifying is an oversimplification and appears to lack a legitimate 
understanding of the commitment required to participate in the Brazilian Pentecostal church.  
 Even in the more relaxed Pentecostal churches, expectations of self discipline are high, 
and a constant effort must be made not to do what is referred to as “backsliding” (a reference to 
                                                 
 35.  Mariz, Coping with Poverty, 26.  
 36.  Freston “Pentecostalism in Brazil,”131. 
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reverting to unacceptable behaviors).  Moral expectations are strict, particularly when compared 
with traditional Catholicism, which holds the expectation that through the sacraments of 
confession and repentance, a member who has sinned may remain within the church body.  In the 
Brazilian Pentecostal church, however, when a woman becomes pregnant out of wedlock, she is 
expelled from the church and may not return (although she is free to join a different 
congregation, if she repents of this behavior.)
37
  For women in the Pentecostal church, not only 
moral codes, but conservative dress codes are used to establish respect and obedience, as well as 
foster self-esteem among members.  Freston’s consumer market explanation of the popularity of 
the movement of divine healing is weak.  A more viable explanation of its popularity is its gift of 
power to the powerless.  
V.  Power for the Powerless  
 Religion can be a powerful coping mechanism for the poor because it removes the feeling 
of powerlessness inherent to the condition of poverty.  Healing and miracles are part of the daily 
life of Pentecostals.  Conversions often come about through healing, which is a testament to the 
power of the religion as well as the empowerment of the individual.  The individual has only but 
to truly believe for the supernatural occur.   While Pentecostalism is not unique in helping people 
to overcome powerlessness, it is unique in interpreting miracles as “part of God's plan.”38  
 The Pentecostal church in Brazil has indeed enjoyed its widest appeal among poor 
people, and as of 1995, its membership was still made up mostly of the poor.
39
  Some see the 
Pentecostal movement as a factor that will contribute to improvement for the poor, while others 
feel that the conservatism of the Pentecostal message will foster political withdrawal and hinder 
                                                 
 37.  Mariz, Coping with Poverty, 150. 
 38.  Mariz, Coping with Poverty, 145. 
 39.  Mariz, Coping with Poverty, 80. 
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social change.
40
  There is evidence to show, however, that while converts may become more 
productive (as in the case of the former alcoholic who becomes employable), the strong work 
ethic promoted by Pentecostalism is not a new creation for the member.  Even though conversion 
to Pentecostalism has served to promote literacy in adults (who learn to read because of their 
motivation to read the Bible),
41
 it does not result in any improved mobility that can elevate its 
followers out of poverty.   
In her personal studies of Spiritists, traditional Catholics, CEB members, and 
Pentecostals, Mariz found that all of them defined themselves as hard workers and considered 
being called a “hard worker” as a compliment and a form of self-definition.  Even though 
religious conversion did not establish a work ethic they did not already have, because of the 
healing that often accompanies conversion to Pentecostalism (as in the case of the recovered 
alcoholic), Pentecostal converts are often affected economically because of the member's new 
ability to participate in that work ethic.  More importantly, what was unique among Pentecostals 
was that economic and work success was always credited to “God's blessing,” a work ethic not 
found in other religions among the poor.
42
   
 With those claiming Pentecostal affiliation making up nearly half of the population of 
Brazil today, there are certainly some interesting questions about the long-term positive effects of 
a religion that motivates literacy in adults and recovery from alcoholism and drugs.  However, it 
could be said that because of their attribution of economic success to God's will, Pentecostalism 
may also work more to foster an acceptance of poverty rather than deliverance from it.  Evidence 
shows that while some of the positive effects of conversion may promote movement to higher 
                                                 
 40.  Mariz, Coping with Poverty, 67. 
 41.  Mariz, Coping with Poverty, 135. 
 42.  Mariz, Coping with Poverty, 123. 
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stratas of poverty (for example, learning to read), even those who would educate themselves are 
rarely allowed to move out of poverty in Brazil and into the middle class.   
 In order to consider the relationship of poverty to Pentecostalism, it is important to 
understand the chronic nature of poverty in Brazil.  While nearly insurmountable class barriers 
prevent the poor from rising out of poverty, movement within the strata of poor is dependent on 
one's ability to cope with poverty.
43
  The nature of personal empowerment that Pentecostalism 
can provide is a useful tool for coping. Converts report improvements to their lives, such as 
spiritual peace, better health and more personal stability as a consequence of overcoming health 
problems.
44
  However, in her review of the research regarding Weberian theory
45
 (which holds 
that the Protestant ethic will provide an economic advantage in capitalist society), Mariz found 
that although Pentecostal churches and some of their pastors might become greatly enriched over 
time, the material conditions of most Pentecostal members did not change substantially.
46
  This 
finding is in spite of the claim of Pentecostals themselves to have experienced economic 
improvement after conversion, a belief which is also shared by their pastors.   
VI.  The Issue of Income Inequality  
 Before examining the issue of income inequality in Brazil, it is helpful to place it in the 
wider context of income inequality in the world, as well as provide a description of the GINI 
Index and SWID database, which were used to compile statistics for the Tables presented in this 
paper. 
            A.       The Human Development Index (HDI) and Pentecostalism 
                                                 
 43.  Mariz, Coping with Poverty, 34. 
 44.  Mariz, Coping with Poverty, 35. 
 45. Referring to Maximilian Weber and his book The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism. 
 46.  Mariz, Coping with Poverty, 35. 
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 Because social scientists have traditionally held that Pentecostalism is primarily attractive 
to poor people in countries with low human development, there is a contradiction that needs to 
be considered in countries where human development is high or poverty has improved, and 
Pentecostalism continues to grow.  There should also be a legitimate curiosity by researchers as 
to why Pentecostalism continues to be so attractive to people in countries with high rates of 
human development and income, such as the United Kingdom and the United States.   
 The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI), which is compiled as part of their 
annual Human Development Report (HDR),
47
 gathers statistics on a variety of factors of human 
development, ranging from poverty, education and gender issues, to income inequality.  A review 
of statistics from the 1998 HDI
48
 presents two questions: 
 1.     What do countries on the low end of the HDI spectrum like Kenya and Nigeria, 
whose rankings for 1998 were 138 and 151 respectively, have in common with high ranking 
countries like the United Kingdom or the United States, when all four of these countries are 
experiencing rapid growth in Pentecostalism?;  
 2. Why are countries with high HDIs like the U.S. and the U.K. experiencing rapid 
growth in Pentecostalism while other countries with high HDIs like Norway (no. 2) and Sweden 
(no. 6) are not?  Any proposal that the variance between cultures is so broad as to account for this 
gap is inadequate.  
 Because the United States has a high rate of human development and income compared to 
the Third World, researchers have chronically dismissed it as an “exception” when trying to 
justify the rapid growth of Pentecostalism in developing countries like Brazil as a by-product of 
                                                 
47.  United Nations. “Human Development Indicators” in Human Development Report 2000 . Ed. 
Bruce Ross-Larson. Published for the United Nations Development Programme, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000. 
 48. See Appendix B. 
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poverty and low human development.  Because the Pentecostal movement began in the United 
States, there is a certain irony in this dismissal and their unwillingness to look at how that 
movement grew and is growing today as relevant to the Third World.  Instead of excluding the 
growth of Pentecostalism in the United States as irrelevant to the Third World, its inclusion 
suggests a commonality with Brazil and other countries that merits attention and should motivate  
more in depth research – income inequality.   
 
            B.      The GINI Index and the SWID Database 
 In order to examine such a potential relationship, statistics on income inequality need to 
be paired with statistics on the growth of Pentecostalism, and correlates of human development 
must also be considered. The GINI index, a coefficient based on a scientific model called the 
Lorenz curve,
49
 is the most commonly accepted equation that has been used worldwide, 
including by the IBGE, as an indicator of income inequality.  However, calculation of the GINI 
coefficient is a complex task, and finding reliable figures for Brazil and other countries presents 
an obstacle to this type of research since traditional sources for the GINI, including the United 
Nations, World Bank, and CIA Factbook, sometimes have different figures and none have been 
able to offer comprehensive figures for countries across time.  
 Fortunately, in 2009, Dr. Frederick Solt, an Assistant Professor in the Department of 
Political Science at Southern Illinois University, who has written extensively on income 
inequality, recognized that “cross-national research on the causes and consequences of income 
                                                 
49.  “A model developed by economist Max Lorenz in 1905.  It represents a probability 
distribution of statistical values, and is often associated with income distribution calculations.  For 
example, a Lorenz curve can show that the bottom  40 percent of households bring in 25 percent of a 
country's income.  If income distribution were perfectly equal,  40  percent of households would 
bring in 40 percent of income.”http://www.investorwords.com/6570/Lorenz_curve.html. 
  
16 
 
inequality [had] been hindered by the limitations of existing inequality data sets”50 and 
responded to the problem by creating a project called the Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database or SWID.
51
  The SWID, drawing on a variety of resources, provides comparable GINI 
indices of gross and net income inequality along with estimates for margins of error,
52
 and 
includes 173 countries with data as far back as 1960 where available.  The SWID is provided 
free to researchers on the web in Excel format, and is continually updated as more and/or better 
information becomes available.  It is an invaluable tool for examining the theory of a causal 
relationship between income inequality and the growth of Pentecostalism, and may produce data 
supporting the need to reexamine current psycho-sociological theories about the modern 
attraction of Pentecostalism worldwide.  Further research in this area is needed. 
  C.     The World Christian Encyclopedia 
 For purposes of this paper in measuring the growth of Pentecostalism, The World 
Christian Encyclopedia
53
 was selected.   It includes data collected through the year 2000, and is 
the source for the figures offered in Table B.  Notwithstanding the problematic nature of 
collecting statistics on religious membership, i.e. that such numbers are only as good as the 
individuals and/or churches reporting that information, there is reason to consider pursuit of this 
research.  A report released in 2006 by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life
54
 claimed that 
Pentecostals made up 10 percent or more of the populations of Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Kenya, 
Nigeria, South Africa, the Philippines, South Korea, and the United States.  Although this figure 
tells nothing about the relative growth of Pentecostalism in these countries, it is still notable that 
                                                 
50.  Frederick Solt. “Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database,” Social Science 
Quarterly 90, no. 2 (June 2009): 231. 
51.  Federick Solt. The Standardized World Income Inequality Database, http://hdl.handle.net/ 
1902.1/11992 V4 (2009). 
52.  Solt, “Standardizing the World,” 231. 
53.  David Barrett, et al. World Christian Encyclopedia. 
54.  Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life.  Spirit and Power, 4. 
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out of 133 countries with a recorded GINI index for 2005,
55
 as shown in Table A, all but South 
Korea lingered low on the list, including the United States, as follows:  Brazil-115; Chile-116; 
Guatemala-127; Kenya-108; South Africa-132; the Philippines-99; South Korea-28; and the 
United States-63. 
 As Dr. Solt has noted, recent work in the sociology of religion has largely neglected the 
role of economic inequality,
56
 and except for Dr. Solt, there seems to be no one suggesting that 
income inequality may be a major player in the paradoxical growth of Pentecostal churches.  
Recognizing and understanding the potential impact of such causality is important because it has 
the potential to nullify predictions that institutional fragmentation of Pentecostals will prevent 
them from developing political power of any concern.  Again, further research is needed. 
 D.   Income Inequality in Brazil 
 Any discussion of income inequality in Brazil must begin with statistics on the rising 
median income, and any discussion of median income must be qualified by actual numbers 
because of the way in which they highlight the broadening income gap.   
 The HDI for Brazil as reported by the United Nations is evidence that Brazil has indeed 
made progressive strides in education and poverty.  In 1998, Brazil was ranked 74 out of 150 
countries assessed.  In 1998, a rank of 74 placed Brazil in the “Medium” category for human 
development out of categories of “High, Medium, and Low”, a rank which would now place it as 
“High” since the categories were later expanded to include “Very High.”  Because the HDI takes 
into consideration factors including poverty and education, then if logic follows, as human 
development improves, there should be at least a leveling off, if not a reduction, in the growth of 
                                                 
55.  No GINI index for Nigeria in 2005 was available; however, Nigeria had a GINI rank of 94 
out of 136 countries recorded in 2004. 
56.  Solt, “Economic Inequality”, 447. 
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Pentecostalism, but that is simply not the case.  Brazil's progress in education, poverty, and 
human development have continued to improve, yet figures from the World Christian 
Encyclopedia show the Pentecostal church grew from 7.2 percent of the population in 1970 to 
47.0 percent of the population in 2000. 
 Although Brazil has seen a steady increase in GDP per capita income over time, it has 
also experienced a simultaneous increase in income inequality.  Between the years 1975 and 
1998, while the GDP per capita income went from $3,464 to $4,509,
57
 income inequality, as 
represented by the GINI Index, went from 42.4118 in 1970 to 51.67709 in 1998, and the current 
gap (according to the 2010 IBGE census) can be described as follows: The poorest 10 percent 
earn 1.1 percent  of the country's earnings, while the richest 10 percent earn 44.5 percent; the 
poorest worker earns approximately $928.80 per year, while the  richest 1 percent earn an 
average of $112,000.00 per year.
58
 
 Table B shows the relationship of income inequality to Pentecostalism in Brazil and 
several other countries from 1970 to 2000, using the latest version of the SWID data set
59
 and the 
Pearson r to calculate the correlation.  The Table is incomplete, but with an initial correlation of 
0.704714, there would seem to be reason to pursue this research further.  It also shows a GINI 
coefficient for Brazil that first increased, then decreased slightly over 30 years from 42.4118 to 
51.91955, but as such still remains one of the highest GINI numbers in the world, ranked at 126 
out of 141 in 2000, as shown in Table C.  The GINI coefficient offered by the IBGE for 2000 is 
                                                 
57. United Nations. Human Development Report 2000.  
58. “In Booming Brazil, Census Shows Income Gap Persists.” 
http://www.worldcrunch.com/booming-brazil-census-shows-income-gap-persists/business- finance/in-
booming-brazil-census-shows-income-gap-persists/c2s4115/.  Original article published by America 
Economia.  Nov 20, 2011.  Accessed December 1, 2012.  
59.  Solt, The Standardized World Income Inequality Database. 
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even higher at 61.1,
60
 although this number may have been calculated before taxes and transfers 
and the numbers provided in Table B are net figures.   
 Table B also raises the question as to whether such a correlation is unique to Brazil, or 
whether it reflects a larger worldwide pattern.  Before any hypothesis can be made, a more 
comprehensive study of countries over time is in order, and more research is needed.   While 
there is no denying that people who live in poverty are attracted to Pentecostalism, poverty does 
not appear to be the only force driving its continued growth.   
VII.  Relative Power Theory 
 We know that poverty attracts people to Pentecostalism, but does prosperity also attract 
them? Despite Freston's extensive background and research on Pentecostalism and politics in 
Latin America, his statement that it “is largely a non-white religion and is increasingly distant 
from worldly power and wealth”61 is either an attempt to placate the concerns of a specific 
audience, or somewhat naïve.  Not only is there growing evidence that wealthy people are 
becoming increasingly attracted to the Pentecostal church, but as a religion first home grown in 
the United States, there has never been a shortage of outside funding for Pentecostal churches in 
Brazil, especially from the United States.    
 In their examination of the relationship of income inequality to religiosity, Frederick Solt, 
Philip Habel, and J. Tobin Grant asked whether as income inequality increases, does religion 
increase primarily as a source of comfort for the deprived (deprivation theory), or does it also 
become a tool of social control for the rich and powerful?
62
  After all, the renovadas, like the 
                                                 
60.  See IBGE, Censo Demográfico 2000. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (2000).  
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/censo2000/trabalho_rendimento/tabrendbr123.pdf 
 Accessed Nov 12, 2012.  The table does not specify if figures are gross or net. 
61.  Freston, A Quiet Tendency, 21. 
62.  Solt, et al. Economic Inequality, 448. 
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Renewed Baptist Church and the Renewed Presbyterian Church, are now a phenomena of the 
historical Protestant churches in Brazil, and their membership is primarily middle class.
63
   
 With the expanding gap in income inequality, there is also mounting evidence that 
wealthy people are joining the church at an increasing rate, which not only contradicts the theory 
that Pentecostalism is a religion for the poor, but presents new questions as to the potential 
influence of outside churches and wealthy individuals who are contributing to Brazilian churches 
both from inside and outside the country.  As wealthy individuals join Pentecostal congregations 
and contribute according to their ability, do they gain more influence within the church body as a 
natural consequence of large donations?  If so, it doesn’t really matter whether such contributions 
are part of sincere active religious participation or a superficial offering intended to gain 
influence.  If money equals influence in the church, then either way, it serves to put the minority 
of wealthy individuals in a position of wielding influence over the majority who live in poverty. 
Some of the larger churches, like Assemblies of God and Foursquare Gospel, have 
received untold millions of dollars over the years of ‘missions’ money from their counterparts in 
the United States.  Bishop Macedo has even set up branches of his native Brazilian IURD in the 
U.S. that are now contributing funds to the church in Brazil.  The concept that wealthy foreign 
interests might avail themselves of religion and foreign missionaries to further their own 
purposes of wealth and power is not new.  In the book Thy Will Be Done, Gerard Colby and 
Charlotte Dennett detail how over the course of the 20
th
 century, big business and foreign 
interests, including the U.S. government and the CIA, used American missionaries in Latin 
America to prop up Latin American dictatorships, “secure resources, and pacify indigenous 
                                                 
63.  Mariz, Coping with Poverty, 26. 
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peoples in the name of democracy, corporate profit and religion.”64  
 As noted earlier, despite a growing economy and rising median income, the income 
inequality gap in Brazil has historically remained one of the highest in the world, a situation 
which should be expected to increase discontent over time and nurture the potential for a demand 
of redistribution.  In their research of this issue, Solt, et al. have proposed Relative Power 
Theory, which holds that income inequality not only makes religion more attractive to the 
wealthy, but increases their power to spread religion to others.
65
  As money is more concentrated 
in a small group of people, then power is more concentrated in that same group, and therefore the 
rich have more power relative to the poor.  This circumstance allows the wealthy greater power 
to spread their values among the poor in a way that works to discourage materialism in favor of 
eternal and spiritual rewards, thus helping to preserve the privileges of the rich and continue the 
status quo.
66
  Although there is insufficient documentation to support this theory of the flow of 
money from wealthy individuals to Pentecostal churches, in the case of Brazil, such 
dissemination could be a powerful panacea indeed.  More research is needed. 
 So while religion may offer utility to the poor by providing a source of comfort, it may 
also be used by the rich as a tool of social control.
67
  All things being equal, greater inequality as 
manifested by the poor getting poorer and the rich getting richer, should result in a reduction of 
religiosity of the rich, or at least at a certain level, have no effect on their religiosity.
68
  In a 
study
69
 of data measuring Average Religiosity by Income Inequality, and Estimated Effects of 
                                                 
64.  Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett. Thy will be done: the conquest of the Amazon : Nelson 
Rockefeller and Evangelism in the age of oil (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1995). Back matter. 
 65.  Frederick Solt, Philip Habel, and J. Tobin Grant. “Economic Inequality, Relative Power, 
and Religiosity." Social Science Quarterly 92, no. 2 (June 2011): 449. 
66.  Solt, et al., “Economic Inequality, Relative Power”, 463. 
67.  Solt, et al., “Economic Inequality, Relative Power Theory”, 462. 
68.  Solt, et al., “Economic Inequality, Relative Power Theory”, 448. 
69.  Solt, et al., “Economic Inequality, Relative Power Theory”, 462. 
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Inequality on Religiosity by Income Quintile,
70
 Solt, et al. conclude that contrary to deprivation 
theory, rich people actually exhibit greater religiosity at higher levels of income inequality and 
that “income inequality has a powerful positive effect on religiosity of all members of society 
regardless of income.”  It is possible that some of the wealthy may seek to use religion for more 
social control, while others who are sensitive to the gap between themselves and the poor, may 
seek religion to justify their position of wealth.   
In any case, the data shows that “at extremely high levels of inequality, those with the 
highest incomes are actually predicted to be more likely to identify themselves as religious than 
are otherwise similar people with the lowest incomes.”71 This statistic contradicts the belief that 
religiosity is stronger in those who are poor.  However, Solt acknowledges that there has been 
little empirical research done to examine this relationship, and more research is need.   
 It has long been understood that religion can be used as a tool to help preserve the status 
quo, but this may ring especially true for Pentecostals in Brazil, whose attitude, as Mariz pointed 
out, is unique among other religions when it comes to attribution of economic and work success 
to ‘God's will’ (also considered part of ‘God's plan’).  Such divine attribution of economic 
position must not only be seen as a useful coping tool for the poor, but also as a useful tool for 
the wealthy to help poor people accept their ‘lot in life’, especially when that lot is attributable to 
no less than a Divine power.  Pentecostalism is thereby not only a player in the political arena 
because of its institutional wealth and authoritarian power to move congregations in the electoral 
process, but also as a religion whose design is especially conducive as a tool for social control 
when compared with other religions in Brazil. 
 Is it possible then that Pentecostalism is being intentionally used as a manipulative tool of 
                                                 
70.  See Appendix C, Figures 1 and 3 
71.  Solt, et al., “Economic Inequality, Relative Power Theory”, 458. 
  
23 
 
distraction for the poor in Brazil?  In their research exploring income and issue voting around the 
world, De La O and Rodden set out, in part, to examine the Marxian argument that religion 
undermines the relationship between income and voting by creating a second issue dimension 
that distracts the poor from their material interests.
72
  By looking at the negative correlation 
between religiosity and redistribution – that is, why people with low income will often vote 
against their own economic interests based on issues of religious morality – De La O and Rodden 
provide empirical support that across advanced democracies, religion does work to break ties 
between the poor and parties of the left.  The drawback to their research in terms of this paper is 
that they did not include Brazil in their examination of advanced industrial societies.  However, 
their observations regarding the efforts of right-wing parties to strategically target and support 
conservative moral issues as a method of separating fundamentalist religious groups from liberal 
policies, and left-wing parties that support the economic interests of the poor, are very relevant to 
this discussion. 
 One of the remarkable things that also needs to be mentioned about the individualism 
promoted by Pentecostalism is that, unlike the Catholic church, which is willing to help anyone 
who is poor, including non-members, the Pentecostal church does not believe in outreach of 
material support to the poor in the community, and with the exception of some of the wealthier 
churches,
73
 they do not provide material support or charity to their own members, nor do their 
members expect it.  This exclusionary attitude, even when it comes to charity, fits in well with 
the theme of nationalism that accompanies income inequality.  At the same time, the church itself 
encourages financial contributions even from its poorest constituents as an act of faith, and has 
                                                 
72.   A. L. De La O and J.A. Rodden “Does Religion Distract the Poor?: Income and Issue Voting 
Around the World.” Comparative Political Studies 41(2008):468. 
73.  Cécilia Mariz, Coping with Poverty, 82. 
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not only been highly criticized for this by other religions in Brazil, but the Umbandists actually 
say that the Pentecostals are downright “greedy.”74  
 Solt has further argued that statistics show economic inequality comes hand-in-hand with 
a willingness to accept authoritarianism and that the concomitant encouragement of nationalism 
is a diversion to keep the poor from recognizing income inequality and mobilizing against it.
75
  
In a study of the social origins of authoritarianism, he found that economic inequality within 
countries shapes attitudes toward authority because as the gap widens and relative power of the 
wealthy increases, individuals are more likely to see hierarchical relationships as natural and 
more willing to accept authoritarianism.
76
  
 Christian Smith, on the other hand, argues that because “historically individualism is 
strongly associated with the functioning of liberal democracy,”77 that despite its authoritarian 
nature, the rational individualism encouraged by the Pentecostal church has potential as a social 
force in support of democratization.
78
 But while Smith sees the potential of rational 
individualism to promote participation in a democracy, he overlooks the self-involved 
nationalistic nature of the individualism being encouraged by the church, as well as the 
individual's perceived disconnection from participation in the democracy.  The new Pentecostal 
believer in Brazil is not an empowered individual who is likely to participate in the democracy 
outside of authoritarian direction, but rather an individual who, having knowingly suffered from 
powerlessness, is being manipulated into believing she/he has overcome that powerlessness.  
                                                 
74.  Cécilia Mariz, Coping with Poverty, 83. 
75.  Frederick Solt. “Diversionary Nationalism: Economic Inequality and the Formation of 
National Pride. The Journal of Politics 73, (July 2011): 821. 
76.  Solt, Frederick. “The Social Origins of Authoritarianism.” Political Research Quarterly 65, no. 
4 (Dec 2012): 703. 
77.  Christian Smith. "The Spirit and Democracy: Base Communities, Protestantism, 
Democratization in Latin America." Sociology Of Religion 55, no. 2 (1994):119. 
78.  Christian Smith. “The Spirit and Democracy,” 136. 
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Understanding the potential of the issue driven Pentecostal believer within the democracy is 
important because it contradicts predictions that institutional fragmentation of Pentecostals will 
prevent them from developing political power of any concern, or that the impact of any political 
power they may have “will be smaller than hoped or feared”.79   
 Finally, the method by which the Pentecostal church encourages what is perceived as 
individualism does have some merit in terms of the self-esteem it is likely to give its 
constituents, but in light of relative power theory, it also suggests a conspicuous convenience for 
those in control.  The practice of gathering money from members without providing any material 
support for them, while fostering a mentality that specifically excludes expectation of material 
assistance or participation with anyone from outside the group, can only serve to reinforce 
acceptance of authoritarianism and nationalism. 
 It appears that what began as a post-industrial revolution spiritual revival to bring comfort 
and healing to people in the poor neighborhoods of southern California, has continued to fulfill 
its calling of comfort for the powerless, while being usurped by the powerful as a means to 
convince the have-nots to accept their lot in life.  If academic researchers have been able to 
discern how Pentecostalism lends itself to use as a tool of diversion and social control of the 
poor, then those who would benefit most from such a powerful tool, surely figured it out long 
ago.   
 
                                                 
79.  Freston,  “A Quiet Tendency”, 22. 
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Rank Country GINI Index Rank Country GINI Index
1 Azerbaijan 18.61563 69 Yemen, Republic of 38.13079
2 Slovenia 23.20641 70 Mali 38.21199
3 Denmark 23.59887 71 Malawi 38.57338
4 Sweden 23.7 72 Djibouti 38.92895
5 Slovak Republic 24.32799 73 St. Lucia 39.10148
6 Norway 25.04938 74 Bangladesh 39.12638
7 Finland 25.29313 75 Guinea 39.16703
8 Belgium 25.41214 76 Liberia 39.22559
9 Belarus 25.57714 77 Chad 39.44017
10 Czech Republic 26.35188 78 Jordan 39.44917
11 Iceland 26.41418 79 Mauritius 39.53512
12 Netherlands 26.74618 80 Georgia 39.61722
13 Austria 26.87447 81 China 39.66666
14 Luxembourg 27.56765 82 Uganda 39.69348
15 Bulgaria 27.59195 83 Iran 39.92923
16 Croatia 27.68371 84 Morocco 40.4925
17 Malta 27.75719 85 Turkmenistan 40.73093
18 France 28 86 Singapore 40.86098
19 Ukraine 28.31509 87 Turkey 40.96178
20 Germany 28.45459 88 Mozambique 41.06888
21 Hungary 28.9 89 Gabon 41.24508
22 Ethiopia 29.18617 90 Congo, Republic of 41.36382
23 Cyprus 29.30589 91 Ghana 41.36533
24 Switzerland 29.83401 92 Moldova 41.47818
25 Japan 30.33875 93 Russian Federation 41.62699
26 Taiwan 30.5 94 Venezuela 42.25407
27 Australia 31.00422 95 Niger 42.90371
28 Korea, Republic of 31.02935 96 Uruguay 42.92076
29 Ireland 31.1471 97 Lebanon 42.92404
30 Poland 31.35653 98 Puerto Rico 43.01752
31 Spain 31.4153 99 Philippines 43.05129
32 Albania 31.43553 100 Rwanda 43.19546
33 Romania 31.70604 101 Congo, Democratic Republic of43.27537
34 Montenegro 31.83057 102 Madagascar 43.61795
35 Canada 31.92331 103 Sierra Leone 43.75809
36 Kyrgyz Republic 32.76967 104 Costa Rica 44.74692
37 Egypt 32.77789 105 El Salvador 45.00086
38 New Zealand 32.86271 106 Argentina 45.67606
39 Serbia 33.12747 107 Mexico 46.07399
40 Greece 33.14656 108 Kenya 46.10921
41 Mongolia 33.15079 109 Swaziland 46.88126
42 Pakistan 33.4505 110 Bhutan 46.95069
43 Italy 33.59571 111 Dominican Republic 47.55025
44 Estonia 33.91154 112 Suriname 48.397
45 India 33.96767 113 Hong Kong 48.62011
46 Burundi 34.00592 114 Lesotho 48.72282
47 Lithuania 34.11016 115 Brazil 48.89679
48 Bosnia and Herzegovina 34.15216 116 Chile 48.9938
49 Togo 34.18234 117 Nicaragua 49.50877
50 Algeria 34.53083 118 Panama 49.95185
51 United Kingdom 34.60025 119 Zambia 49.9909
52 Kazakhstan 35.30977 120 Cape Verde 50.04573
53 Indonesia 35.37492 121 Botswana 50.55334
54 Lao 35.60261 122 Papua New Guinea 50.7367
55 Portugal 35.92988 123 Peru 50.84728
56 Latvia 36.04774 124 Paraguay 50.89317
57 Benin 36.27282 125 Colombia 51.00035
58 Armenia 36.40614 126 Ecuador 51.20006
59 Senegal 36.46976 127 Guatemala 51.35305
60 Tunisia 36.66434 128 Honduras 52.28558
61 Israel 37 129 Bolivia 53.06416
62 Uzbekistan 37.01731 130 Angola 57.89126
63 United States 37.08701 131 Comoros 63.11312
64 Trinidad and Tobago 37.5741 132 South Africa 63.5195
65 Macedonia, FYR 37.59695 133 Namibia 66.63813
66 Guinea-Bissau 37.6561
67 Malaysia 37.8335
68 Viet Nam 37.99531
Table A. 2005 Countries Ranked by GINI Index
28
HDI 
Rank in 
2000 Country 1970 1990 1995 2000
Overall 
Increase 
or 
Decrease
Growth in 
decimals % Growth 1970 1990 1995 2000
Overall 
Increase 
or 
Decrease
Growth in 
Decimals % Growth
74 Brazil 42.4118 52.439 51.498 51.91955 9.51 0.22 22 7.2 46.3 46.6 47.0 39.8 5.53 553
6 Sweden 23.98895 20.966 22.1 25.20000 1.21 0.05 5 3.7 6.6 6.9 7.0 3.3 0.89 89
2 Norway 22.07197 23.221 23.8 25.00000 2.93 0.13 13 27.0 26.6 28.0 1.0 0.04 4
8 Netherlands 25.80183 26.2 25.621 23.85152 -1.95 -0.08 -8 6.3 6.4 6.6 0.3 0.05 5
3 United States 31.07847 33.57 36.244 36.80000 5.72 0.18 18 10.7 25. 0 26.2 27.0 16.3 1.52 152
128 India 34.6937 31.401 33.518 32.44186 -2.25 -0.06 -6 3.1 3.2 3.3 0.2 0.06 6
Correlation = 0.70471
2
  From David Barett, et al., World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Study of Churches and Religions in the Modern World, AD 1900-2000.
Table B. Sample Comparison of Growth in Income Inequality
1
 vs. Pentecostalism
2 
1970-2000
Income Inequality (GINI Coefficient) Growth of Pentecostalism
1
  GINI statistics from The Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWID).
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Rank Country GINI Index Rank Country GINI Index
1 Denmark 22.5 72 Ghana 38.66319
2 Netherlands 23.85152 73 St. Lucia 39.32022
3 Bulgaria 24.09009 74 Senegal 39.34562
4 Slovak Republic 24.14499 75 Singapore 39.66674
5 Finland 24.6 76 Djibouti 39.69599
6 Slovenia 24.75473 77 Morocco 39.87928
7 Norway 25 78 Guinea 40.05529
8 Sweden 25.2 79 Tunisia 40.13733
9 Austria 25.7 80 Mauritius 40.18535
10 Luxembourg 26 81 Armenia 40.5553
11 Czech Republic 26.12981 82 Mali 41.26604
12 Iceland 26.41089 83 Uruguay 42.07724
13 Belarus 27.24871 84 Moldova 42.40331
14 Cyprus 27.44013 85 Turkey 42.54047
15 Germany 27.5 86 Iran 42.67017
16 Romania 27.64459 87 Venezuela 42.71492
17 France 27.8 88 Mozambique 43.05385
18 Belgium 27.9 89 Lebanon 43.38559
19 Switzerland 28 90 Russian Federation 43.4
20 Hungary 28.49049 91 Puerto Rico 43.60297
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina 28.52534 92 Cambodia 43.81113
22 Poland 28.63375 93 Costa Rica 44.113
23 Taiwan 28.9 94 Madagascar 44.45781
24 Albania 29.00245 95 Nepal 44.60774
25 Serbia and Montenegro 29.40376 96 Cameroon 44.6489
26 Korea, Republic of 29.69439 97 Malawi 44.88077
27 Montenegro 29.9516 98 Sri Lanka 44.96283
28 Malta 30.64935 99 Cote d`Ivoire 44.99813
29 Croatia 31.08129 100 Philippines 45.00458
30 Ireland 31.3 101 Niger 45.22618
31 Azerbaijan 31.43489 102 Hong Kong 45.97879
32 Canada 31.5 103 Kenya 46.15197
33 Tajikistan 31.67925 104 Thailand 46.25727
34 Australia 31.6885 105 Uganda 46.41862
35 Pakistan 31.78497 106 Argentina 46.69929
36 Kazakhstan 32.41473 107 Rwanda 46.71782
37 India 32.44186 108 Central African Republic46.71833
38 Indonesia 32.46549 109 Bahamas 46.79119
39 Kyrgyz Republic 32.54451 110 Nigeria 46.97179
40 Ukraine 32.69234 111 Malaysia 47.02662
41 Japan 32.75501 112 Dominican Republic 47.1074
42 Macedonia, FYR 32.92113 113 Gambia 47.27573
43 Mongolia 32.95449 114 Sierra Leone 47.6336
44 Lithuania 33.07193 115 El Salvador 48.10117
45 Turkmenistan 33.1445 116 Papua New Guinea 48.33247
46 Latvia 33.16035 117 Suriname 48.68386
47 Greece 33.3 118 Jamaica 48.73756
48 Italy 33.3 119 Mexico 49.1
49 New Zealand 33.50341 120 Honduras 49.90186
50 Yemen, Republic of 33.55442 121 Swaziland 50.00053
51 Spain 33.6 122 Colombia 50.55997
52 Ethiopia 34.01781 123 Panama 51.28093
53 United Kingdom 34.18522 124 Chile 51.47354
54 Tanzania 34.32567 125 Nicaragua 51.50872
55 Israel 34.3586 126 Brazil 51.91955
56 Uzbekistan 34.79325 127 Botswana 52.11085
57 Lao 35.15971 128 Guatemala 52.18929
58 Portugal 35.36594 129 Ecuador 52.36807
59 Algeria 35.48988 130 Paraguay 52.61308
60 Bangladesh 35.52248 131 Zambia 53.54766
61 Mauritania 35.90786 132 Peru 54.02968
62 Viet Nam 35.96214 133 Haiti 54.17335
63 Egypt 36.0066 134 Cape Verde 54.46241
64 Estonia 36.1 135 Bolivia 54.72391
65 United States 36.8 136 Sao Tome and Principe54.80819
66 Trinidad and Tobago 37.48408 137 Burkina Faso 55.40472
67 Guinea-Bissau 37.58267 138 Lesotho 56.22743
68 Burundi 37.86771 139 Angola 58.49285
69 Jordan 38.21426 140 Namibia 64.43818
70 Georgia 38.47487 141 South Africa 64.61793
71 China 38.4975
Table C. 2000 Countries Ranked by GINI Index
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 Censo Demográfico 2010
 Características gerais da população, religião e pessoas com deficiência
(continua)
Homens Mulheres Homens Mulheres
 Total (1)  190 755 799  93 406 990  97 348 809  160 934 649  77 715 676  83 218 972  29 821 150  15 691 314  14 129 837
Católica Apostólica Romana  123 280 172  61 180 316  62 099 856  100 055 896  48 872 817  51 183 078  23 224 277  12 307 499  10 916 778
Católica Apostólica Brasileira   560 781   282 011   278 770   442 244   218 107   224 137   118 537   63 904   54 633
Católica Ortodoxa   131 571   65 727   65 844   113 301   55 942   57 359   18 270   9 785   8 485
Evangélicas  42 275 440  18 782 831  23 492 609  37 824 089  16 663 271  21 160 818  4 451 350  2 119 560  2 331 791
Evangélicas de Missão  7 686 827  3 409 082  4 277 745  6 795 167  2 978 485  3 816 682   891 659   430 597   461 063
Igreja Evangélica Luterana   999 498   482 382   517 116   686 349   321 395   364 954   313 149   160 987   152 162
Igreja Evangélica Presbiteriana   921 209   405 424   515 785   853 864   373 752   480 112   67 345   31 673   35 672
Igreja Evangélica Metodista   340 938   149 047   191 891   325 652   142 148   183 504   15 286   6 899   8 387
Igreja Evangélica Batista  3 723 853  1 605 823  2 118 029  3 466 862  1 488 390  1 978 472   256 991   117 434   139 557
Igreja Evangélica Congrega-
cional   109 591   48 243   61 348   94 270   40 878   53 392   15 321   7 365   7 957
Igreja Evangélica Adventista  1 561 071   704 376   856 695  1 341 018   599 837   741 182   220 053   104 539   115 513
Outras Evangélicas de Missão   30 666   13 786   16 880   27 151   12 085   15 066   3 514   1 701   1 814
Evangélicas de origem pentecostal  25 370 484  11 273 195  14 097 289  22 371 352  9 855 098  12 516 253  2 999 132  1 418 097  1 581 035
Igreja  Assembléia de Deus  12 314 410  5 586 520  6 727 891  10 366 497  4 662 726  5 703 772  1 947 913   923 794  1 024 119
Igreja Congregação Cristã do 
Brasil  2 289 634  1 060 218  1 229 416  2 006 550   924 354  1 082 196   283 083   135 863   147 220
Igreja o Brasil para Cristo   196 665   85 768   110 897   177 634   77 173   100 461   19 031   8 595   10 436
Igreja Evangelho Quadrangular  1 808 389   774 696  1 033 693  1 706 628   727 634   978 994   101 761   47 062   54 699
Igreja Universal do Reino de 
Deus  1 873 243   756 203  1 117 040  1 766 246   708 533  1 057 713   106 998   47 670   59 328
Igreja Casa da Benção   125 550   52 274   73 276   118 659   49 177   69 483   6 890   3 097   3 793
Igreja Deus é Amor   845 383   365 250   480 133   723 155   308 092   415 063   122 228   57 159   65 069
Igreja Maranata   356 021   156 185   199 835   339 526   148 657   190 869   16 495   7 529   8 966
Igreja Nova Vida   90 568   37 026   53 542   88 898   36 342   52 556   1 670    684    986
Evangélica renovada não deter-
minada   23 461   10 412   13 049   21 605   9 549   12 056   1 856    863    993
Comunidade Evangélica   180 130   77 990   102 141   174 584   75 456   99 128   5 546   2 533   3 013
Outras igrejas  Evangélicas de 
origem pentecostal  5 267 029  2 310 653  2 956 377  4 881 368  2 127 405  2 753 963   385 661   183 247   202 414
Evangélica não determinada  9 218 129  4 100 554  5 117 575  8 657 570  3 829 688  4 827 883   560 559   270 866   289 693
Situação do domicílio
Urbana Rural
Tabela 1.4.1 - População residente, por situação do domicílio e sexo,
segundo os grupos de religião - Brasil - 2010
Grupos de religião
População residente
Total
Total
Sexo
Total
Sexo
Homens Mulheres
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Tabelas de resultados 
(conclusão)
Homens Mulheres Homens Mulheres
Outras religiosidades cristãs  1 461 495   666 772   794 723  1 350 719   613 118   737 601   110 776   53 654   57 122
Igreja de Jesus Cristo dos Santos dos 
Últimos Dias   226 509   107 144   119 366   222 224   104 957   117 266   4 286   2 186   2 099
Testemunhas de Jeová  1 393 208   579 466   813 742  1 328 406   550 262   778 144   64 801   29 204   35 598
Espiritualista   61 739   24 857   36 882   59 131   23 702   35 429   2 608   1 155   1 453
Espírita  3 848 876  1 581 701  2 267 176  3 776 857  1 546 013  2 230 843   72 020   35 687   36 332
Umbanda   407 331   182 119   225 213   398 506   177 546   220 960   8 825   4 572   4 253
Candomblé   167 363   80 733   86 630   163 115   78 584   84 531   4 248   2 149   2 099
Outras declarações de religiosidades 
afro brasileira   14 103   6 636   7 467   13 816   6 484   7 332    287    152    135
Judaismo   107 329   53 885   53 444   105 342   52 821   52 520   1 987   1 063    924
Hinduismo   5 675   2 942   2 733   5 598   2 899   2 699    77    43    33
Budismo   243 966   110 403   133 563   235 649   106 116   129 533   8 316   4 287   4 030
Novas Religiões Orientais   155 951   63 813   92 139   150 597   61 261   89 336   5 355   2 552   2 803
Igreja messiânica mundial   103 716   41 980   61 736   100 221   40 326   59 895   3 496   1 654   1 842
Outras novas religiões orientais   52 235   21 833   30 402   50 376   20 935   29 441   1 859    898    961
Outras Religiões Orientais   9 675   4 502   5 173   9 491   4 401   5 090    185    101    83
Islamismo   35 167   21 042   14 124   34 894   20 849   14 044    273    193    80
Tradições Esotéricas   74 013   42 095   31 918   70 878   40 219   30 659   3 136   1 876   1 259
Tradições Indígenas   63 082   32 095   30 987   19 366   9 832   9 534   43 716   22 263   21 453
Outras Religiosidades   11 306   5 135   6 171   9 925   4 426   5 500   1 380    709    671
Sem religião  15 335 510  9 082 507  6 253 004  13 742 551  8 103 211  5 639 340  1 592 960   979 296   613 664
Sem religião  14 595 979  8 592 492  6 003 486  13 043 340  7 640 022  5 403 318  1 552 638   952 470   600 168
Ateu   615 096   411 397   203 699   577 994   386 643   191 351   37 102   24 753   12 348
Agnóstico   124 436   78 618   45 818   121 216   76 545   44 671   3 220   2 072   1 147
Não determinada e múltiplo perten-
cimento   643 598   302 807   340 791   591 792   276 476   315 315   51 807   26 331   25 475
Religiosidade não determinada/
mal definida   628 219   295 713   332 506   578 347   270 469   307 878   49 872   25 244   24 628
Declaração de múltipla religiosi-
dade   15 379   7 094   8 284   13 445   6 007   7 438   1 934   1 087    847
Fonte: IBGE, Censo Demográfico 2010.
(1) Inclusive as pessoas sem declaração de religião e não sabiam.
Tabela 1.4.1 - População residente, por situação do domicílio e sexo,
segundo os grupos de religião - Brasil - 2010
Grupos de religião
População residente
Total Homens Mulheres
Situação do domicílio
Urbana Rural
Total
Sexo
Total
Sexo
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1 Human
development
index Combined
primary, GDP
Adult secondary and Human per capita
Life literacy tertiary gross development (PPP US$)
expectancy rate enrolment GDP index rank
at birth (% age 15  ratio per capita Life (HDI) minus
(years) and above) (%) (PPP US$) expectancy Education GDP value HDI
HDI rank 1998 1998 1998a 1998 index index index 1998 rankb
High human development
1 Canada 79.1 99.0 c 100 23,582 0.90 0.99 0.91 0.935 8
2 Norway 78.3 99.0 c 97 26,342 0.89 0.98 0.93 0.934 1
3 United States 76.8 99.0 c 94 29,605 0.86 0.97 0.95 0.929 -1
4 Australia 78.3 99.0 c 114 d 22,452 0.89 0.99 0.90 0.929 9
5 Iceland 79.1 99.0 c 89 25,110 0.90 0.96 0.92 0.927 1
6 Sweden 78.7 99.0 c 102 d 20,659 0.90 0.99 0.89 0.926 15
7 Belgium 77.3 99.0 c 106 d 23,223 0.87 0.99 0.91 0.925 4
8 Netherlands 78.0 99.0 c 99 22,176 0.88 0.99 0.90 0.925 6
9 Japan 80.0 99.0 c 85 23,257 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.924 1
10 United Kingdom 77.3 99.0 c 105 d 20,336 0.87 0.99 0.89 0.918 13
11 Finland 77.0 99.0 c 101 d 20,847 0.87 0.99 0.89 0.917 8
12 France 78.2 99.0 c 93 21,175 0.89 0.97 0.89 0.917 5
13 Switzerland 78.7 99.0 c 80 25,512 0.90 0.93 0.92 0.915 -9
14 Germany 77.3 99.0 c 90 22,169 0.87 0.96 0.90 0.911 1
15 Denmark 75.7 99.0 c 93 24,218 0.85 0.97 0.92 0.911 -8
16 Austria 77.1 99.0 c 86 23,166 0.87 0.95 0.91 0.908 -4
17 Luxembourg 76.8 99.0 c 69 e 33,505 0.86 0.89 0.97 0.908 -16
18 Ireland 76.6 99.0 c 91 21,482 0.86 0.96 0.90 0.907 -2
19 Italy 78.3 98.3 83 20,585 0.89 0.93 0.89 0.903 3
20 New Zealand 77.1 99.0 c 96 17,288 0.87 0.98 0.86 0.903 7
21 Spain 78.1 97.4 94 16,212 0.89 0.96 0.85 0.899 9
22 Cyprus 77.9 96.6 81 f 17,482 0.88 0.92 0.86 0.886 3
23 Israel 77.9 95.7 81 17,301 0.88 0.91 0.86 0.883 3
24 Singapore 77.3 91.8 73 24,210 0.87 0.86 0.92 0.881 -16
25 Greece 78.2 96.9 81 13,943 0.89 0.91 0.82 0.875 9
26 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 78.6 92.9 64 20,763 0.89 0.83 0.89 0.872 -6
27 Malta 77.3 91.5 79 16,447 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.865 2
28 Portugal 75.5 91.4 93 14,701 0.84 0.92 0.83 0.864 3
29 Slovenia 74.6 99.6 g 81 14,293 0.83 0.93 0.83 0.861 4
30 Barbados 76.5 97.0 h, i 80 12,001 i, j 0.86 0.91 0.80 0.858 9
31 Korea, Rep. of 72.6 97.5 90 13,478 0.79 0.95 0.82 0.854 4
32 Brunei Darussalam 75.7 90.7 72 16,765 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.848 -4
33 Bahamas 74.0 95.5 74 14,614 0.82 0.88 0.83 0.844 -1
34 Czech Republic 74.1 99.0 c 74 12,362 0.82 0.91 0.80 0.843 3
35 Argentina 73.1 96.7 80 12,013 0.80 0.91 0.80 0.837 3
36 Kuwait 76.1 80.9 58 25,314 i, j 0.85 0.73 0.92 0.836 -31
37 Antigua and Barbuda 76.0 h 95.0 h, i 78 c 9,277 0.85 0.89 0.76 0.833 9
38 Chile 75.1 95.4 78 8,787 0.83 0.90 0.75 0.826 9
39 Uruguay 74.1 97.6 78 8,623 0.82 0.91 0.74 0.825 9
40 Slovakia 73.1 99.0 c 75 9,699 0.80 0.91 0.76 0.825 5
41 Bahrain 73.1 86.5 81 13,111 0.80 0.85 0.81 0.820 -5
42 Qatar 71.9 80.4 74 20,987 i, j 0.78 0.78 0.89 0.819 -24
43 Hungary 71.1 99.3 g 75 10,232 0.77 0.91 0.77 0.817 -1
44 Poland 72.7 99.7 g 79 7,619 0.80 0.92 0.72 0.814 10
45 United Arab Emirates 75.0 74.6 70 17,719 0.83 0.73 0.86 0.810 -21
46 Estonia 69.0 99.0 c 86 7,682 0.73 0.95 0.72 0.801 7
Medium human development
47 Saint Kitts and Nevis 70.0 h 90.0 h, i 79 c 10,672 0.75 0.86 0.78 0.798 -7
48 Costa Rica 76.2 95.3 66 5,987 0.85 0.85 0.68 0.797 18
49 Croatia 72.8 98.0 69 6,749 0.80 0.88 0.70 0.795 7
50 Trinidad and Tobago 74.0 93.4 66 7,485 0.82 0.84 0.72 0.793 5
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51 Dominica 76.0 h 94.0 i, k 74 c 5,102 0.85 0.87 0.66 0.793 27
52 Lithuania 70.2 99.5 g 77 6,436 0.75 0.92 0.70 0.789 8
53 Seychelles 71.0 h 84.0 h, i 76 c 10,600 0.77 0.81 0.78 0.786 -12
54 Grenada 72.0 h 96.0 h, i 76 c 5,838 0.78 0.89 0.68 0.785 13
55 Mexico 72.3 90.8 70 7,704 0.79 0.84 0.73 0.784 -3
56 Cuba 75.8 96.4 73 3,967 l 0.85 0.89 0.61 0.783 40
57 Belarus 68.1 99.5 g 82 6,319 0.72 0.93 0.69 0.781 6
58 Belize 74.9 92.7 73 4,566 0.83 0.86 0.64 0.777 25
59 Panama 73.8 91.4 73 5,249 0.81 0.85 0.66 0.776 14
60 Bulgaria 71.3 98.2 73 4,809 0.77 0.90 0.65 0.772 19
61 Malaysia 72.2 86.4 65 8,137 0.79 0.79 0.73 0.772 -10
62 Russian Federation 66.7 99.5 g 79 6,460 0.69 0.92 0.70 0.771 -3
63 Latvia 68.7 99.8 g 75 5,728 0.73 0.91 0.68 0.771 6
64 Romania 70.2 97.9 70 5,648 0.75 0.88 0.67 0.770 6
65 Venezuela 72.6 92.0 67 5,808 0.79 0.84 0.68 0.770 3
66 Fiji 72.9 92.2 81 4,231 0.80 0.88 0.63 0.769 23
67 Suriname 70.3 93.0 h, i 80 5,161 i, j 0.76 0.89 0.66 0.766 9
68 Colombia 70.7 91.2 71 6,006 0.76 0.85 0.68 0.764 -3
69 Macedonia, TFYR 73.2 94.6 i, m 69 4,254 0.80 0.86 0.63 0.763 19
70 Georgia 72.9 99.0 h, i 72 3,353 0.80 0.90 0.59 0.762 29
71 Mauritius 71.6 83.8 63 8,312 0.78 0.77 0.74 0.761 -21
72 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 70.2 78.1 92 6,697 i, j 0.75 0.83 0.70 0.760 -15
73 Kazakhstan 67.9 99.0 c 77 4,378 0.72 0.92 0.63 0.754 11
74 Brazil 67.0 84.5 84 6,625 0.70 0.84 0.70 0.747 -16
75 Saudi Arabia 71.7 75.2 57 10,158 0.78 0.69 0.77 0.747 -32
76 Thailand 68.9 95.0 61 5,456 0.73 0.84 0.67 0.745 -5
77 Philippines 68.6 94.8 83 3,555 0.73 0.91 0.60 0.744 17
78 Ukraine 69.1 99.6 g 78 3,194 0.73 0.92 0.58 0.744 26
79 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 73.0 h 82.0 h, i 68 c 4,692 0.80 0.77 0.64 0.738 2
80 Peru 68.6 89.2 79 4,282 0.73 0.86 0.63 0.737 7
81 Paraguay 69.8 92.8 65 4,288 0.75 0.84 0.63 0.736 5
82 Lebanon 70.1 85.1 77 4,326 0.75 0.82 0.63 0.735 3
83 Jamaica 75.0 86.0 63 3,389 0.83 0.78 0.59 0.735 15
84 Sri Lanka 73.3 91.1 66 2,979 0.81 0.83 0.57 0.733 25
85 Turkey 69.3 84.0 61 6,422 0.74 0.76 0.69 0.732 -24
86 Oman 71.1 68.8 58 9,960 i, j 0.77 0.65 0.77 0.730 -42
87 Dominican Republic 70.9 82.8 70 4,598 0.76 0.79 0.64 0.729 -5
88 Saint Lucia 70.0 h 82.0 i, k 68 c 5,183 0.75 0.77 0.66 0.728 -14
89 Maldives 65.0 96.0 75 4,083 0.67 0.89 0.62 0.725 1
90 Azerbaijan 70.1 99.0 c 72 2,175 0.75 0.90 0.51 0.722 29
91 Ecuador 69.7 90.6 75 3,003 0.75 0.85 0.57 0.722 17
92 Jordan 70.4 88.6 69 c 3,347 0.76 0.82 0.59 0.721 8
93 Armenia 70.7 98.2 72 2,072 0.76 0.90 0.51 0.721 29
94 Albania 72.9 83.5 69 2,804 0.80 0.78 0.56 0.713 17
95 Samoa (Western) 71.7 79.7 65 3,832 0.78 0.75 0.61 0.711 -3
96 Guyana 64.8 98.3 66 3,403 0.66 0.88 0.59 0.709 1
97 Iran, Islamic Rep. of 69.5 74.6 69 5,121 0.74 0.73 0.66 0.709 -20
98 Kyrgyzstan 68.0 97.0 h, i 70 2,317 0.72 0.88 0.52 0.706 19
99 China 70.1 82.8 72 3,105 0.75 0.79 0.57 0.706 7
100 Turkmenistan 65.7 98.0 h, i 72 c 2,550 i 0.68 0.89 0.54 0.704 14
Combined
primary, GDP
Adult secondary and Human per capita
Life literacy tertiary gross development (PPP US$)
expectancy rate enrolment GDP index rank
at birth (% age 15  ratio per capita Life (HDI) minus
(years) and above) (%) (PPP US$) expectancy Education GDP value HDI
HDI rank 1998 1998 1998a 1998 index index index 1998 rankb
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101 Tunisia 69.8 68.7 72 5,404 0.75 0.70 0.67 0.703 -29
102 Moldova, Rep. of 67.8 98.6 70 1,947 0.71 0.89 0.50 0.700 22
103 South Africa 53.2 84.6 95 8,488 0.47 0.88 0.74 0.697 -54
104 El Salvador 69.4 77.8 64 4,036 0.74 0.73 0.62 0.696 -13
105 Cape Verde 69.2 72.9 78 3,233 0.74 0.75 0.58 0.688 -3
106 Uzbekistan 67.8 88.0 77 2,053 0.71 0.84 0.50 0.686 17
107 Algeria 69.2 65.5 69 4,792 0.74 0.67 0.65 0.683 -27
108 Viet Nam 67.8 92.9 63 1,689 0.71 0.83 0.47 0.671 24
109 Indonesia 65.6 85.7 65 2,651 0.68 0.79 0.55 0.670 4
110 Tajikistan 67.5 99.0 69 1,041 0.71 0.89 0.39 0.663 43
111 Syrian Arab Republic 69.2 72.7 59 2,892 0.74 0.68 0.56 0.660 -1
112 Swaziland 60.7 78.3 72 3,816 0.60 0.76 0.61 0.655 -19
113 Honduras 69.6 73.4 58 2,433 0.74 0.68 0.53 0.653 2
114 Bolivia 61.8 84.4 70 2,269 0.61 0.80 0.52 0.643 4
115 Namibia 50.1 80.8 84 5,176 0.42 0.82 0.66 0.632 -40
116 Nicaragua 68.1 67.9 63 2,142 0.72 0.66 0.51 0.631 4
117 Mongolia 66.2 83.0 h, i 57 1,541 0.69 0.74 0.46 0.628 10
118 Vanuatu 67.7 64.0 h, i 47 3,120 0.71 0.58 0.57 0.623 -12
119 Egypt 66.7 53.7 74 3,041 0.69 0.60 0.57 0.623 -11
120 Guatemala 64.4 67.3 47 3,505 0.66 0.61 0.59 0.619 -24
121 Solomon Islands 71.9 62.0 h, i 46 1,940 0.78 0.57 0.49 0.614 5
122 Botswana 46.2 75.6 71 6,103 0.35 0.74 0.69 0.593 -57
123 Gabon 52.4 63.0 h, i 63 c 6,353 0.46 0.63 0.69 0.592 -60
124 Morocco 67.0 47.1 50 3,305 0.70 0.48 0.58 0.589 -22
125 Myanmar 60.6 84.1 56 1,199 i, j 0.59 0.75 0.41 0.585 25
126 Iraq 63.8 53.7 50 3,197 i, j 0.65 0.52 0.58 0.583 -22
127 Lesotho 55.2 82.4 57 1,626 0.50 0.74 0.47 0.569 6
128 India 62.9 55.7 54 2,077 0.63 0.55 0.51 0.563 -7
129 Ghana 60.4 69.1 43 1,735 0.59 0.60 0.48 0.556 0
130 Zimbabwe 43.5 87.2 68 2,669 0.31 0.81 0.55 0.555 -18
131 Equatorial Guinea 50.4 81.1 65 1,817 i, j 0.42 0.76 0.48 0.555 -4
132 São Tomé and Principe 64.0 h 57.0 h, i 49 c 1,469 0.65 0.54 0.45 0.547 7
133 Papua New Guinea 58.3 63.2 37 2,359 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.542 -17
134 Cameroon 54.5 73.6 46 1,474 0.49 0.64 0.45 0.528 4
135 Pakistan 64.4 44.0 43 1,715 0.66 0.44 0.47 0.522 -4
136 Cambodia 53.5 65.0 h, i 61 1,257 0.48 0.64 0.42 0.512 1
137 Comoros 59.2 58.5 39 1,398 0.57 0.52 0.44 0.510 5
138 Kenya 51.3 80.5 50 980 0.44 0.70 0.38 0.508 18
139 Congo 48.9 78.4 65 995 0.40 0.74 0.38 0.507 16
Low human development
140 Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 53.7 46.1 57 1,734 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.484 -9
141 Madagascar 57.9 64.9 40 756 0.55 0.56 0.34 0.483 23
142 Bhutan 61.2 42.0 h, i 33 m 1,536 0.60 0.39 0.46 0.483 -4
143 Sudan 55.4 55.7 34 1,394 0.51 0.48 0.44 0.477 0
144 Nepal 57.8 39.2 61 1,157 0.55 0.46 0.41 0.474 7
145 Togo 49.0 55.2 62 1,372 0.40 0.57 0.44 0.471 0
146 Bangladesh 58.6 40.1 36 1,361 0.56 0.39 0.44 0.461 0
147 Mauritania 53.9 41.2 42 1,563 0.48 0.41 0.46 0.451 -11
148 Yemen 58.5 44.1 49 719 0.56 0.46 0.33 0.448 18
149 Djibouti 50.8 62.3 21 1,266 i, j 0.43 0.49 0.42 0.447 -2
150 Haiti 54.0 47.8 24 1,383 0.48 0.40 0.44 0.440 -7
Combined
primary, GDP
Adult secondary and Human per capita
Life literacy tertiary gross development (PPP US$)
expectancy rate enrolment GDP index rank
at birth (% age 15  ratio per capita Life (HDI) minus
(years) and above) (%) (PPP US$) expectancy Education GDP value HDI
HDI rank 1998 1998 1998a 1998 index index index 1998 rankb
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1 Human
development
index
151 Nigeria 50.1 61.1 43 795 0.42 0.55 0.35 0.439 10
152 Congo, Dem. Rep. of the 51.2 58.9 33 822 0.44 0.50 0.35 0.430 8
153 Zambia 40.5 76.3 49 719 0.26 0.67 0.33 0.420 12
154 Côte d’Ivoire 46.9 44.5 41 1,598 0.36 0.43 0.46 0.420 -20
155 Senegal 52.7 35.5 36 1,307 0.46 0.36 0.43 0.416 -9
156 Tanzania, U. Rep. of 47.9 73.6 33 480 0.38 0.60 0.26 0.415 17
157 Benin 53.5 37.7 43 867 0.47 0.40 0.36 0.411 0
158 Uganda 40.7 65.0 41 1,074 0.26 0.57 0.40 0.409 -6
159 Eritrea 51.1 51.7 27 833 0.43 0.44 0.35 0.408 0
160 Angola 47.0 42.0 h, i 25 1,821 0.37 0.36 0.48 0.405 -34
161 Gambia 47.4 34.6 41 1,453 0.37 0.37 0.45 0.396 -21
162 Guinea 46.9 36.0 h, i 29 1,782 0.37 0.34 0.48 0.394 -34
163 Malawi 39.5 58.2 75 523 0.24 0.64 0.28 0.385 9
164 Rwanda 40.6 64.0 43 660 i, n 0.26 0.57 0.31 0.382 4
165 Mali 53.7 38.2 26 681 0.48 0.34 0.32 0.380 2
166 Central African Republic 44.8 44.0 26 1,118 0.33 0.38 0.40 0.371 -15
167 Chad 47.5 39.4 32 856 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.367 -9
168 Mozambique 43.8 42.3 25 782 0.31 0.37 0.34 0.341 -6
169 Guinea-Bissau 44.9 36.7 34 616 0.33 0.36 0.30 0.331 0
170 Burundi 42.7 45.8 22 570 0.30 0.38 0.29 0.321 1
171 Ethiopia 43.4 36.3 26 574 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.309 -1
172 Burkina Faso 44.7 22.2 22 870 0.33 0.22 0.36 0.303 -16
173 Niger 48.9 14.7 15 739 0.40 0.15 0.33 0.293 -9
174 Sierra Leone 37.9 31.0 h, i 24 c 458 0.22 0.29 0.25 0.252 0
All developing countries 64.7 72.3 60 3,270 0.66 0.68 0.58 0.642 –
Least developed countries 51.9 50.7 37 1,064 0.45 0.46 0.39 0.435 –
Arab States 66.0 59.7 60 4,140 0.68 0.60 0.62 0.635 –
East Asia 70.2 83.4 73 3,564 0.75 0.80 0.60 0.716 –
East Asia (excluding China) 73.1 96.3 85 13,635 0.80 0.93 0.82 0.849 –
Latin America and the Caribbean 69.7 87.7 74 6,510 0.74 0.83 0.70 0.758 –
South Asia 63.0 54.3 52 2,112 0.63 0.54 0.51 0.560 –
South Asia (excluding India) 63.4 50.5 47 2,207 0.64 0.49 0.52 0.550 –
South-East Asia and the Pacific 66.3 88.2 66 3,234 0.69 0.81 0.58 0.691 –
Sub-Saharan Africa 48.9 58.5 42 1,607 0.40 0.53 0.46 0.464 –
Eastern Europe and the CIS 68.9 98.6 76 6,200 0.73 0.91 0.69 0.777 –
OECD 76.4 97.4 86 20,357 0.86 0.94 0.89 0.893 –
High human development 77.0 98.5 90 21,799 0.87 0.96 0.90 0.908 –
Medium human development 66.9 76.9 65 3,458 0.70 0.73 0.59 0.673 –
Low human development 50.9 48.8 37 994 0.43 0.45 0.38 0.421 –
High income 77.8 98.6 92 23,928 0.88 0.96 0.91 0.920 –
Medium income 68.8 87.8 73 6,241 0.73 0.83 0.69 0.750 –
Low income 63.4 68.9 56 2,244 0.64 0.65 0.52 0.602 –
World 66.9 78.8 64 6,526 0.70 0.74 0.70 0.712 –
Note: The human development index has been calculated for UN member countries with reliable data in each of its components, as well as for two non-members, Switzerland and Hong Kong, China (SAR).
For data on the remaining 16 UN member countries see table 32.
a. Preliminary UNESCO estimates, subject to further revision. b. A positive figure indicates that the HDI rank is higher than the GDP per capita (PPP US$) rank, a negative the opposite. c. Human Develop-
ment Report Office estimate. d. For purposes of calculating the HDI, a value of 100.0% was applied. e. The ratio is an underestimate, as many secondary and tertiary students pursue their studies in nearby
countries. f. Not including Turkish students or population. g. For purposes of calculating the HDI, a value of 99.0% was applied. h. UNICEF 1999c. i. Data refer to a year or period other than that specified
in the column heading, differ from the standard definition or refer to only part of the country. j. Heston and Summers 1999. k. UNICEF 1996. l. As GDP per capita (PPP US$) is not available for Cuba, the sub-
regional weighted average for the Caribbean was used. m. Human Development Report Office estimate based on national sources. n. World Bank 1999a. 
Source: Column 1: unless otherwise noted, interpolated on the basis of life expectancy data from UN 1998c; column 2: unless otherwise noted, UNESCO 2000a; column 3: unless otherwise noted, UNESCO
2000c; column 4: unless otherwise noted, World Bank 2000a; columns 5-9: Human Development Report Office calculations; see the technical note for details.
Combined
primary, GDP
Adult secondary and Human per capita
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expectancy rate enrolment GDP index rank
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2009). We use SWIID data on the Gini index of inequality in net household
income, which has a theoretical range from 0, perfect equality, to 100,
perfect inequality. The lowest observed level of income inequality in our
data set, 17.5, was found in 1990 in the Slovak lands of then-Czechoslo-
vakia; the highest, 60.6, occurred in South Africa in 2001.
Figure 1 displays the bivariate relationships between income inequality
and average religiosity across the society-years in our sample. All the WVS/
EVS items display powerful and easily visible connections to income in-
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FIGURE1
Average Religiosity by Income Inequality, WVS/EVS 1981–2007
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Most striking, however, is the strong support for the relative power the-
ory. Economic inequality is estimated to powerfully increase religiosity and
to do so regardless of income. The competing hypothesis provided by de-
privation theory that inequality increases religiosity among the poor but
decreases it among the rich is not supported for any aspect of religiosity
considered, as can be seen in the graphs of Figure 3. These graphs display
how the predicted probabilities (or values, for the three ordinal variables) of
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FIGURE3
Estimated Effects of Inequality on Religiosity by Income Quintile
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